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Abstract: Abstract: Abstract: Abstract:       
We present a model of job search in which information about job opportunities is 
available either through direct search at the labor market or through network of 
socially tied individuals. We consider two cases - altruistic and self-interested agents 
that maximize their utility function. We show that optimal strategies range between 
full  and  no  referring  cases.  Altruistic  individuals  tend  to  refer  more  than  self-
interested agents. Strategic referring allows agents alleviate employment variation 
and leads to higher average utility levels and lower unemployment rates 
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1.  Introduction 
Labor economists have long been interested in job search and the role of networks in it. 
Employee referrals are widely used and highly efficient in labor market search. In this paper I 
attempt to investigate decisions about job referrals in case of strong and weak ties between 
individuals  within  the  network.  Utility  of  agents  connected  with  strong  ties  is  mutually 
dependent whereas utility of agents connected through weak ties does not depend on the 
utility of other agents within the network. 
The key insight of the model is that decision about sending a referral to other member of the 
network  is  made  intentionally  and influences agents’ utility. The  model shows that  most 
successful family networks (networks of mutually altruistic agents) use referrals more often 
than networks of acquaintances (networks of agents connected by weak ties) but they do not 
use  referring  every  time.  On  the  other  hand,  even  for  networks  of  acquaintances  it  is 
advantageous to use referral hiring at some level.  
 
2.  Related literature 
Empirical research has  shown that  approximately fifty percent  of jobs are found through 
friends, relatives, and other social contacts. A great deal of empirical studies on the frequency 
of  usage  of  social  contacts  analyzes  US  data  sources.  Rees  and  Shultz  (1970)  analyzed 
employment search in Chicago for 12 occupations, eight of which were blue-collar jobs. They 
found that the percentage share of blue-collar workers hired through referral hiring ranged 
between  53.6%  (tool  and  die  maker)  and  73.8%  (material  handler)  compared  to  23.5% 
(accountant) and 37.9% (tab operator) for white-collar workers. Grantovetter (1974) studied   2 
professional, technical and managerial workers (residents of Newton) and found that 43.5% to 
65.5% of workers successfully used their network of friends and relatives to find employment. 
Holzer (1988) studied job search of unemployed young men (age 16 – 23). He found that 85 
percent of participants used friends or relatives within one month of job search. Two most 
successful methods of job search proved to be friends and relatives and direct application. 
Together they constitute 67% of all reported offers. The offers received through friends and 
relatives  were accepted much more often (in  81% of cases  compared to 40% in case of 
newspaper search and 65% in case of direct application).  
Bentolila et al. (2006) used US and European data from Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality 
that covered years 1992 to 1994 and European Community Household Panel that covered 
period 1995 to 1998. They found that the use of social contacts in job search leads to 1 to 1.5 
months  shorter  period  of  job  search.  For  US  sample,  the  period  of  unemployment  is  on 
average 30% shorter for individuals who found their jobs through social contacts than for 
other workers. Using European data, the unemployment duration is about one month shorter 
for workers using referral hiring which is approximately 9% of the unemployment duration of 
the reference worker. 
Addison  and  Portugal  used  quarterly  Labour  Force  Surveys  of  the  Portuguese  National 
Institute of Statistics and found that 7.5% of those who used friends or relatives found job via 
that method in the following period compared to 1.9% of those who used advertisement, 1.5 
of those who used public employment agency or 4.3% of those with direct approach. Addison 
and Portugal show that friends and relatives route fails to facilitate the reemployment of older 
workers  compared  to  younger  workers  and  white-collar  workers  compared  to  blue-collar 
workers. They conclude that mostly different observed characteristics define the success of 
the various job-finding methods. 
There has been an important distinction in labor market networks made by Mark Granovetter 
(1983) who defined two types of social links – strong and weak ties. Strong ties are valuable 
in themselves, typical example of strong ties are ties to friends and relatives. Weak ties are 
rather  instrumental;  individuals  are  less  emotionally  involved.  Granovetter  argues  that 
acquaintances are often more useful in providing an information about jobs than friends and 
relatives.  Although  friends  and  relatives  are  likely  to  be  more  interested  in  helping, 
acquaintances are more probable to deliver useful information. Acquaintances are less likely 
to be involved in the same environment as job seeker and hence more likely to provide useful   3 
unexploited  information  about  employment  opportunities.  Study  of  Eriksen  and  Yansey
1 
showed that people with lower education tend to use strong ties more often. According to 
Granovetter (1983) poor and insecure people tend to rely more on strong ties.  
Social networks are used both by employers looking for employees and job seekers looking 
for employment. Social network is a source of information about job opportunities as well as 
candidates. First, workers disseminate information about job opportunity through word-of-
mouth communication to other members of their social network. The stronger the tie the more 
likely is that the information will be transferred. At the same time, the information received 
through  social  network  is  much  profound  and  comprehensive  than  information  received 
through other channels. In comparison with simple announcement about the skills required 
and position being filled, the word-to-mouth transmission comprises many other details and 
also “the inside story” such as precise description of working conditions, duties, corporate 
culture and other non-pecuniary characteristics attached to the job. This much more profound 
knowledge of particular job leads to much higher rate of job acceptance (Holzer (1988)), 
employees display lower turnover rate and stay longer in the firm.  
The information asymmetry is serious drawback in recruitment of new employees. Companies 
use various screening procedures to separate the wheat from the chaff. They use signals such 
as  years  of  schooling  and  experience,  grades,  letters  of  recommendation  etc.  The  use of 
interviews and various tests (psychological, skill-testing, language tests, IQ tests etc.) is quite 
common. However, all kinds of these screening methods are limited and may lead to both 
types of mistakes – rejection of valuable potential employee, or acceptation of “shirker”. 
Therefore, the information provided by current employee about job applicant is extremely 
valuable.  There  are  numerous  studies  analyzing  the  reliability  of  referrals  by  current 
employees.  Calvo-Armengol  (2006)  writes:  “Empirical  accounts  all  show  that  referred 
applicants´ likely performance is, on average, higher than that of external applicants.” In a 
nutshell, there are three reasons for this outcome. First, employees tend to refer accurate 
information because their own reputation may be at stake. Saloner (1985) proved that if there 
exists a competition among employees than even if they use their private information about 
applicants  strategically,  the  outcome  will  be  the  same  as  if  employers  had  the  private 
information themselves. Second, they are concerned with the quality of their future colleagues 
themselves.  And  third,  people  tend  to  refer  people  similar  to  themselves.  Because  the 
relationship between employer and incumbent employee is usually of a long-term nature, 
                                                
1 Ericksen, E., Yancey. W. (1980) Class, Sector and Income Determination in Granovetter (1983)   4 
employer has sufficient information on incumbents´ characteristics. Hence, the referral can be 
an efficient screening method.  
Simon and Warner (1992) tested  the  hypothesis that referred workers should earn higher 
initial wages, experience lower subsequent wage growth and stay longer than workers hired 
from outside the network and found strong empirical support.  
Hence, we see that referral hiring is very effective method of recruitment as well as a very 
effective method of job search. However, if we consider the success of the network as a 
whole, sometimes, available referral is not exploited because of diversification phenomenon. 
Networks that choose the best mix of referring and diversification of employment of their 
members among available firms survive and their strategies prevail. Stark and Bloom (1985) 
introduced theoretical analysis of decision making of socially tied individuals. People act 
collectively  to  minimize  risks  associated  among  others  with  labor  market.  Families  or 
households are able to control risks by diversifying allocation of resources; one of the most 
important resources is family labor. While some family members can be employed in the local 
economy, others may be sent to work in foreign labor markets where wages and employment 
conditions are negatively or weakly correlated with those in the local market. In case of 
insufficient income due to downturn in local labor market, family can increase its income by 
migrant remittances. (Massey et al. (1993)) Hence, families use employment diversification to 
mitigate risk. Diversification of allocation of labor can mean being employed in agriculture in 
different  regions  with  adverse  agricultural  conditions,  or  in  different  sectors  of  economy 
whose  risks  are  not  correlated  or  to  be  employed  in  companies  whose  performance  are 
negatively or weakly correlated. For empirical research see e.g. Chen and Chiang (2001), 
Stark and Lavhari (1982).  
 
3.  The Model 
We present a computational model of job search and investigate referring decisions of agents 
involved within social networks, connected by either strong or weak ties.  
 
Agents and networks 
 
At the beginning of each simulation N networks are created each of which consists of n 
agents.  
   5 
Figure 3.1: Networks 
 
 
Agents are characterized by type, strategy and network. Type is characteristic of agent that 
makes him compatible with the job of the same type. Type includes not only qualification or 
skills needed to exert the job but also other characteristics that are impossible to communicate 
through formal job advertising methods, hence to receive the information about the job type 
an agent need to be either given the referral through his network or apply for the job in given 
firm.  
An agent receives wage 1 if employed and wage 0 if unemployed.  
Each agent is member of one network. All agents within the network are of the same type, 
they are mutually connected and they are able to provide information about vacancies to each 
other.  
The utility of agent is defined by following utility function: 
j i i W w u ⋅ + = α  
where wi is  wage received by  the agent  i, Wj is sum of wages of other members of the 
network. α is set either to 0 or to 1. For α = 0 agent is interested only in his own wage (we 
will call this utility function non-altruistic) and the relation between agents is characterized by 
weak ties defined by Granovetter. Social networks characterized by strong ties such as family 
networks are in our model expressed as the network of agents with α = 1, who are effectively 
altruistic in a sense defined by Becker (1981):  
 
“Altruistic” means that agent’s utility function depends positively on the well-being 
of  other  agents  and  effectively  means  that  agent’s  behavior  is  changed  by  his 
altruism. 
 
Agents choose strategies S∈ R to maximize their utility. Each employed agent follows this 
rule: If sum of network members within his firm
2 exceeds S, he does not refer to unemployed 
members of his network about vacancies. Otherwise the agent sends referrals about vacancies 
in his firm to other members of his network. 
                                                
2 He does not count himself.   6 
There are two possible modes in which networks operate. Either function LEADER is active 
in which case all agents within one network follow the same strategy and strategy evaluation 
takes place on the level of networks (utility levels achieved by whole network are evaluated) 
or function LEADER is not activated in which case each agent chooses his own strategy 
independently of others and strategies of individual agents are evaluated and compared with 




At the beginning of each simulation 2*N firms are created, each firm consists of m vacancies. 
The probability that the firm bankrupts in given period is equal to b. Firms do not search for 
employees, they fill the vacancy with an applicant in case he is of the same type as the 
vacancy. All jobs within the firm are of the same type. 
 
Job search and dynamics 
 
In the first period all agents randomly choose one firm and apply for the job. In case that the 
job is of the same type as they are, agents are willing to take up the job. In case there are more 
or exactly the same number of vacancies in the firm as the number of applicants all applicants 
are  accepted.  Otherwise  firm  randomly  chooses  among  applicants  those  who  fill  the 
vacancies, referred workers are preferred. Agents are employed within the firm until the firm 
bankrupts. At the end of each period employed workers can send referrals to unemployed 
members of their network. In case that the number of other members of agent’s network in the 
firm is lower than S, agent sends a referral to one member of his network. 
At the beginning of following period each firm bankrupts with the probability b. In case of 
bankruptcy  all  agents  employed  within  the  firm  become  unemployed.  In  place  of  each 
bankrupted firm new firm of the same type occurs.  
Each unemployed agent  (who  did not receive a referral) randomly chooses one firm and 
applies for the job. The same process as in the first period occurs. In case that agent received a 
referral,  she  applies  for  the  job  in  the  referred  firm  if  the  firm  did  not  bankrupt  at  the 
beginning of the period. She is accepted if number of applicants is lower than number of 
vacancies. Otherwise, firm randomly chooses from suitable candidates, referred agents are 
preferred. 
   7 
Evolution of strategies 
 
In the first period the strategy is set randomly between 0 and (n – 1). Average strategy is 
therefore  equal  to 
2
1 − n
.  Each  network  (LEADER)  or  agent  (NON-LEADER)  follow 
randomly  chosen  strategy  for  the  next  fifty  periods.  At  the  end  of  fiftieth  period  each 
network’s or agent’s average utility is calculated. Networks are ranked according to average 
utility and 30 percent of networks or agents with lowest utility abandon their current strategy 
and adopt new strategy.  
 
Table 3.2: Events schedule 
PERIOD       
Model  Create N networks, each of them consists of n agents 
Model  Create N*2 firms, each of consists of m vacancies 
Agents  All agents go to the labor market, randomly choose firm and apply for the job 
Agents  If type of job accords with agent’s type, agent is willing to accept the job 
Firms  Firm accepts applicants, in case of abundance of applicants, it randomly 
chooses those who will be employed 
1 
Agents  Employed agents send referrals according to their strategy 
        
Model  Firm bankrupts with probability b 
Model  Instead of each bankrupted firm new firm of the same type is created  
Agents  Unemployed agents go on the labor market and search for job, those who 
received referrals go to referred firm, otherwise they choose randomly 
Agents  If type of job accords with agent’s type, agent is willing to accept the job 
Firms  Firm accepts applicants, in case of abundance of applicants, it randomly 
chooses those who will be employed 
2 
Model  Employed agents send referrals according to their strategy 
:       
Model  Firm bankrupts with probability b 
Model  Instead of each bankrupted firm new firm of the same type is created  
Agents  Unemployed agents go on the labor market and search for job, those who 
received referrals go to referred firm, otherwise they choose randomly 
Agents  If type of job accords with agent’s type, agent is willing to accept the job 
Firms  Firm accept applicants, in case of abundance of applicants, it randomly 
chooses those who will be employed 
Model  Employed agents send referrals according to their strategy 
Agents  Calculate average utility for previous 50 periods 
Model  Ranks networks according to average utilities 
Network 
30% of networks or agents with lowest average utility change their strategies 
(randomly choose one of strategies used by  30% of most successful networks 
or agents) 
50 
Model  With probability d the strategy of network is changed by + 1 or - 1 
   8 
Thirty percent of networks with the highest utility are taken and each of the least successful 
networks randomly adopts one of their strategies. Then networks or agents follow their new 
strategy for the next fifty periods and then again utility is calculated. 
To enable agents to search the strategy space properly, there exist a mutation in strategies that 
is applied at rate d. Each fiftieth period strategies are revised as described above. After the 
strategy correction there exists the probability d that the network or agent changes its strategy 
by 1 (either adds 1 or deducts 1 from current strategy). 
 
At the beginning of each simulation we set: 
•  Number of networks 
•  Number of agents within the network  
•  Number of professions 
•  Probability of bankruptcy 
•  Mutation rate 
 
4.  Simulation results 





Simulation runs lasted 2,000 or 20,000 periods (ticks). Hence, the strategies were evaluated 
and revised 40 or 400 times. All results quoted in this section were received as an average of 
10 simulations for given setting for runs lasting 2,000 periods and 5 simulations for 20,000 
periods lasting runs. 
 
                                                
3 Number of networks and different types influence only computational manageability of simulations, number of 
agents within the network changes ability of agents to find optimal solutions (with rising number of agents 
within the network the link between agent’s action and utility achieved is weaker).     9 
4.1  Comparison of full referring, no referring and strategic referring  
First of all we compare simulation results in three cases: full referring (employed agents refer 
about all vacancies), strategic referring (employed agents refer about vacancies according to 
their strategy, they refer only in case that number of other members of their network in the 
firm is lower or equal to S) and no referring (agents do not refer about vacancies at all).  
For five agents within the network full referring means that the strategy is equal to 4. In case 
of no referring the strategy is equal to 0. We can see in Table 4.1 that if agents were given the 
choice they have chosen average strategy 2.6817 for ALTRUISTIC, LEADER setting and 
1.9989 for NON-ALTRUISTIC, NON-LEADER setting and 20,000 periods. For both settings 
strategy chosen by agents is significantly lower than 4. NON-ALTRUISTIC, NON-LEADER 
setting shows lower strategies than ALTRUISTIC, LEADER maximization.  
In  case  of  strategic  referring  average  utility  achieved  is  highest  and  average  number  of 
unemployed agents is lowest of all three compared cases. At the same time variances are 
lowest in no referring case because agents are more evenly distributed across firms and hence 
they are more equally hit by unemployment and drops in wage (and utility) level. 
  
Table 4.1: Comparison of full, strategic and no referring 
ALTRUISTIC, LEADER 
   full referring  strategic referring  no referring 
strategy  4  2.6817  0 
average utility  2.6138  2.7141  2.4508 
variance utility  0.1401  0.1284  0.0040 
average unemployment  71.6885  68.5779  75.4515 
variance unemployment  126.0765  115.6283  90.8091 
       
NON-ALTRUISTIC, NON-LEADER 
   full referring  strategic referring  no referring 
strategy  4  1.9989  0 
average utility  0.5005  0.5634  0.4969 
variance utility  0.0052  0.0048  0.0042 
average unemployment  74.9147  70.0013   75.4515 
variance unemployment  117.5712  108.5366  90.8091 
 
Let us explain the mechanism causing that average unemployment is lower in case of strategic 
referring than in case that agents fully use their knowledge about vacancies and referring 
about  all  available  vacancies.  Imagine  following  example.  There  are  4  agents  already 
employed in the firm and there is a vacancy to be filled. There are two possibilities. First, 
agents  refer  about  the  vacancy  to  the  last  unemployed  member  of  their  network  and 
consequently all 5 agents are employed in company A. Second, agents do not refer about the   10 
vacancy and fifth agent search independently at the labor market to find firm of the same type. 
Suppose that he finds appropriate job in firm B. Now the firm A bankrupts. In the first case all 
agents become unemployed, they do not receive any referrals until at least one of them finds 
firm of the same type. The chance that at least one of them finds a job within the first period 
of  unemployment  is  approximately  0.76
4.  In  the  second  case,  one  of  them  immediately 
receives referral from one agent employed in firm B. The agents assure through employment 
diversification that in case of bankruptcy of one firm, they receive referral immediately
5.  
Figures  4.1  and  4.2  show  development  of  strategies,  utility  and  unemployment  for  one 
particular  simulation  run  and  altruistic  (leader)  and  non-altruistic  (non-leader)  utility 
functions.  We  see  that  after  few  initial  periods  the  level  of  utility  and  unemployment 
stabilized.  
 









                                                
4 P = 1 – (3/4)
5 
5 If in the surviving firm vacancies exist.   11 
4.2  Bankruptcy rate 
Figures 4.3 to 4.6 show average strategies for different probabilities of bankruptcy. Figures 
show results for simulations  that lasted 2,000 or 20,000 periods. Through  comparison of 
results of simulation with different length we get the information about the ability of agents to 
find optimal solutions. We can see in figures 4.3 and 4.5 that if strategies of agents within the 
network are coordinated (LEADER) the difference between results achieved after 2,000 and 
20,000 is rather small. Hence, we can claim that in case of employment of function LEADER 
agents are more effective in finding optimal solution, they are able to achieve optimal solution 
faster. 
For comparison of strategies chosen in case of ALTRUISTIC & LEADER, ALTRUISTIC & 
NON-LEADER,  NON-ALTRUISTIC  &  LEADER  and  NON-ALTRUISTIC  &  NON-
LEADER setting we will use simulations with 20,000 periods.  
The  level  of  referring  after  20,000  periods  stabilized  at  around  3  for  ALTRUISTIC  & 
LEADER, ALTRUISTIC & NON-LEADER, NON-ALTRUISTIC & LEADER setting and 
the rate of bankruptcy equal to 0.1. With rising probability of bankruptcy the level of referring 
more or less gradually falls to approximately 2.1 for bankruptcy rate 0.9. The reason of falling 
referring  rate  with  rising  bankruptcy  rate  is  risk  diversification.  The  more  volatile  the 
environment is the lower utility gain is achieved if agents refer about vacancies. At the same 
time the importance of network as a mean for risk diversification rises.  
 
Figure 4.3: Average strategies for various bankruptcy rates: ALTRUISTIC, LEADER  
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Figure 4.4: Average strategies for various bankruptcy rates: ALTRUISTIC, NON-LEADER 






































Figures 4.3 and 4.5 show very similar outcomes for different utility functions. The key to this 
result lies in the strategy selection mechanism. In case of LEADER setting, after each fifty 
periods  the  average  utility  of  each  network  is  calculated.  Hence,  the  difference  between 
simulations with NON-ALTRUISTIC and ALTRUISTIC utility function will be only that in 
case  of  ALTRUISTIC utility function the utility of each member of the network will be 
included 5 times compared to NON-ALTRUISTIC case. Therefore, the ranking of networks 
will  be  exactly  the  same  and  the  same  strategies  will  prove  to  be  successful  in  NON-
ALTRUISTIC & LEADER and ALTRUISTIC & LEADER settings.  
For NON-ALTRUISTIC & LEADER setting the agents´ utility function is non-altruistic but 
the fact that evaluation of strategies takes place on the network level causes that cooperative 
strategies prevail in the population. 
 
Figure 4.5: Average strategies for various bankruptcy rates: NON-ALTRUISTIC, LEADER  
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Figure 4.6: Average strategies for various bankruptcy rates: NON-ALTRUISTIC, NON-
LEADER  







































NON-ALTRUISTIC & NON-LEADER setting (Figure 4.6) exhibits rather opposite pattern to 
previous  three  cases  with  referring  rate  starting  at  0.2  for  probability  of  bankruptcy  0.1 
reaching 2.5 for probability of bankruptcy equal to 0.8. Figures 4.3 to 4.6 show that for NON-
ALTRUISTIC & NON-LEADER setting the rate of referring is lower than for other three 
cases (except for bankruptcy rate 0.8), which is expected result.  
NON-ALTRUISTIC & NON-LEADER setting is the only purely non-altruistic case in which 
agents  decide  independently  and  their  strategies  are  independently  evaluated.  Figure  4.6 
shows the greatest difference between 2,000 and 20,000 periods lasting simulations, which 
suggests  that  for  agents  it  is  fairly  difficult  to  find  optimal  solution.  Furthermore,  the 
cooperative behavior in this setting is limited compared to other three cases. However, even in 
NON-ALTRUISTIC & NON-LEADER setting the cooperative behavior prevailed for higher 
probabilities of bankruptcy.  
For low bankruptcy rates the fact that agent himself finds job is sufficient to assure that his 
strategy survives (because the utility gain from employment is relatively high thanks to long 
lasting employment contract). Furthermore, not to provide information about the vacancy to 
other  agents  within  the  network  improves  agent’s  chances  to  get  good  ranking  when 
evaluation takes place.  
With  rising  volatility  of  labor  market  (rising  bankruptcy  rate)  only  agents  included  in 
networks where high rate of referring prevails are able to attain sufficiently high utility levels 
that  assure  survival  of  their  strategies.  Hence,  even  for  NON-ALTRUISTIC  &  NON-  14 
LEADER setting the cooperative behavior with referring strategies around 2 prevails for high 
bankruptcy rates. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
Previous empirical research has shown the importance of employee referrals in job search. In 
our model we investigate behavior of agents included in two types of networks – networks of 
mutually altruistic individuals (equivalent to strong ties) and networks of agents whose utility 
is not directly mutually connected but who are able to provide information to each other 
(equivalent to weak ties).  
We used two settings: LEADER (all agents within the network follow the same strategy and 
the  strategies  of  30%  of  most  successful  networks  replace  strategies  of  30%  of  least 
successful  networks  during  evaluation  process)  and  NON-LEADER  (agents  within  one 
network individually choose their strategies and strategies of 30% of most successful agents 
replace strategies of 30% of least successful agents during evaluation process). 
Our model suggests that agents use referrals strategically to assure more fluent employment 
history with shorter periods of unemployment. This new view enriches the debate about the 
role of social networks in job search and elucidates the mechanism of job search. We argue 
that even if the utility of individuals within the network is directly related (as e.g. in family 
networks) the rate of referring does not reach the maximum possible value. Put differently, 
not all available vacancies are filled with network members. On the other hand, even in case 
that the utilities of agents within the network are not mutually dependent the cooperative 
behavior emerges to some extent. Hence, through the process of natural selection of more 
successful strategies a cooperative behavior within the networks emerged for both kinds of 
networks - with strong and weak ties.  
At  the  same  time,  agents  linked  with  strong  ties  or  using  LEADER  setting  were  more 
motivated to be of assistance in case of unemployment, because the survival of their strategy 
is directly dependent on the successfulness of whole network. This result is supported by 
empirical  findings  mentioned  in  the  first  section  that  friends  and  relatives  are  the  most 
successful method of job search. The model predicts that the intensity of use of social network 
as a job search mechanism is greater if the expected length of employment within one firm is 
longer. 
For NON-ALTRUISTIC agents with NON-LEADER setting cooperative behavior prevailed 
as well in case of highly volatile environment with high bankruptcy rates. Hence, the opposite   15 
pattern emerged than for ALTRUISTIC & LEADER, NON-ALTRUISTIC & LEADER, and 
ALTRUISTIC & NON-LEADER setting. In this case it is the volatility of environment that 
drives people to cooperate in job search. 
To conclude, our model predicts that for highly volatile labor markets all types of networks 
will follow approximately the same cooperative referring strategies. On contrary, stable labor 
markets with low bankruptcy rates should show significant difference between purely non-
altruistic  setting  (NON-ALTRUISTIC  &  NON-LEADER)  and  three  other  settings 
(ALTRUISTIC  &  LEADER,  NON-ALTRUISTIC  &  LEADER,  ALTRUISTIC  &  NON-
LEADER).  
In the real world the rate of referring about job vacancies should be approximately the same in 
case of highly unstable markets with short employment duration (e.g. for low-skilled workers) 
but should differ for stable labor markets with long employment duration. Job search on these 
labor markets should be characterized by intensive use of referring in case of family networks 
but rather weak use of referrals in case of networks composed of acquaintances.   
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